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Legal Aspects of Police Radar
William K. McCarter*
B EFORE LOOKING into some of the legal aspects of "radar" in regard to
speeding violations, it might be well to point out something about
how this type of radar functions. It should be noted that "police type"
radar is not the same radar that saw its phenomenal growth and develop-
ment during the Second World War and has since become a device of
extreme precision and accuracy. The "pulse type" radar developed and
used by the military operates by sending out a beam of radio waves in
regular intervals which are reflected or bounced back to the receiver
by the object detected. The waves move in both directions at the speed
of light. Thus, the computation between the time of sending out and
receiving back gives the position and the movement of the object de-
tected. Police radar uses a similar but distinct method in which a con-
tinuous beam of high frequency radio waves are sent out at a fixed
frequency. When the waves strike a moving object, the frequency is
changed in ratio to the speed of the object intercepted. By measuring
this change of frequency, the speed of the object intercepted may be
determined. Police type radar is properly termed "Doppler Effect"
Radar and is not the progeny of "pulse type" radar. The Doppler Effect
is a familiar experience. All of us have experienced that the pitch of a
sound depends upon the relative motion of source and observer. As a
siren approaches us it rises in pitch, and as it passes it falls in pitch.'
This principle was first applied to the automobile by traffic engineers
who used "Doppler effect" radar units to study road conditions in re-
lation to speed on curves, intersections, grades, et cetera.
Some of the differences between military "pulse" radar and "police
type" radar are worth noting. Police type radar does not send out sig-
nals at regular intervals but sends out a continuous signal. Therefore
''police type" radar will not electronically record the distance from the
set to the vehicle being clocked. It is also incapable of measuring either
time or distance. Speed is not determined by formula or otherwise from
time and distance relationships. The narrowly adjusted beam does not
avoid hitting other objects ahead or behind its path. The military
"pulse" radar has seen a great deal more research and work. Police
type radar has limitations of physical size, cost, weight, mobility and
engineering expediency that have resulted in compromises in its design
* B.S.S., M.A., John Carroll Univ., J.D. (June 1967), Cleveland-Marshall Law School
of Baldwin-Wallace College.
I Hastings, The Physics of Sound, 56 (1960); Electronics World "Doppler Radar in
Weather Research," 45 (Vol. 73, No. 5, May, 1965); 49 A.L.R.2d 470 (1965).
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that can affect its accuracy.2 There is a conceded engineering tolerance
of approximately two miles per hour in the police radar units.3
As a vehicle approaches the radar unit, it enters its operating zone
or "zone of influence." The length and width of the zone depends on
such factors as the strength of the signal and the transmittor height
above the ground. The unit will record the speed of only one vehicle at
a time, determined by the vehicle presenting the best target by reason
of reflecting surface, position, or speed.4 Based on this, many courts have
pointed out possible defenses to proof of speed by radar. One court has
stated in its opinion there are many more defenses that can be inter-
posed to radar speed interception than to motorcycle apprehension.5
The Early Cases
The use of radar speedmeters to catch speeding violators got an
extensive start in the early 1950's. The early cases held that when data
procured by a radar device were offered in evidence, expert testimony to
establish the fact that radar equipment was a mechanism that correctly
and accurately recorded the speed of passing vehicles was essential to a
conviction.6
About 1955, the attitude of the courts began to change. The trend
was that expert testimony was not essential to a conviction. The leading
case seemed to be State of New Jersey v. Dantonio.7 In this case the
court emphasized the coverage given to radar during World War II and
how the public, while not understanding its intricacies, did not question
its general accuracy and effectiveness. What the court did not point out
was that the public usually falsely assumed that police and military
radar were the same. The case held that evidence of radar speedmeter
readings was admissible upon a showing that the speedmeter was prop-
erly set up and tested by the police officers without any need for the
independent expert testimony of an electrical engineer as to its general
nature and trustworthiness.
There followed a series of cases that held the usefulness of radar
equipment for testing the speed of vehicles had become so well estab-
2 11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts (Supp. 1966, at 34).
3 People v. Nasella, 3 Misc.2d 418, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1956).
4 11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts (Supp. 1966, at 12-13).
5 People v. Sachs, 1 Misc.2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1955).
6 People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953); People v. Tor-
pey, 204 Misc. 1023, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (County Ct. 1953); People v. Beck, 205 Misc.
757, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1954), where it was held that the action of a judge
in taking judicial notice of the operation and accuracy of a radar speedmeter was
reversible error; People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. of Spec. Sess.
1954).
7 18 NJ. 570, 115 A.2d 35, 49 A.L.R.2d 460 (1955).
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lished that the testimony of an expert to prove its reliability was not
necessary and courts would take judicial notice of such fact.8
The Proper Test of Accuracy and Its Proof
While courts will take judicial knowledge of the usefulness of radar
equipment to check the speed of vehicles, rendering the testimony of an
expert to prove its reliability in this respect unnecessary, it is always
necessary to prove the accuracy of the particular equipment used in
testing the speed involvedY The question then is, "What is the proper
test of accuracy and proof?"
There are basically three methods of testing a radar unit for ac-
curacy: internal tests, tuning fork tests, and road tests using a vehicle
with a calibrated speedometer.
The internal tests are done by electronic experts working on the
machine itself using test equipment and procedures to test such things
in the instrument itself as the crystal detector, the cavity output, the
frequency calibration, and the indicator calibration. The standards to
which the indicator calibration should conform is a meter indication
within 1 per cent for the entire range when varying the frequency of
the voltage from the test oscillator from 73.1 to 731 cycles which cor-
responds to 10 miles per hour and to 100 miles per hour respectively.10
This type of test does not enter into court cases very often, since it is
usually held that the test of accuracy must take place at the time the
equipment was being used."
Tuning forks are available calibrated in almost all speeds from
15 mph to 100 mph in multiples of 5 mph. Thus, a tuning fork calibrated
to 50 mph has a frequency of 50 x 7.31. If the 50-mph fork is struck and
placed in front of the transmitter receiver, the reading should be 50 mph
on the meter scale.
It has been held that the testimony of an officer that he tested the
radar device in question with tuning forks as recommended by the
manufacturer and that he also ran a test car through the zone of in-
fluence or "the trap," and the meter read accurately, was sufficient
8 Everight v. Little Rock, 326 S.W.2d 796 (1959); East Cleveland v. Ferrel, 107"
OhioApp. 256, 145 N.E.2d 134 (1957); aff'd 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958);
State v. Colla, 24 Conn. Supp. 13, 185 A.2d 292 (Cir. Ct., App. Div. 1962); U.S. v.
Dreos, 156 F.Supp. 200 (1957), D.C. case applying Maryland law in U.S. District
Court; State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo.App. 1959); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d
562, 147 N.E.2d 729, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958); People v. Sachs, supra note 5; People v.
Nasella, supra note 3; People v. Jamison, 8 Misc.2d 408, 165 N.Y.S.2d 906 (County Ct.
1957); Hardway v. State, 302 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1957); Cromer v. State, 374 S.W.2d
884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
9 Everight v. Little Rock, supra note 8; U.S. v. Dreos, supra note 8; People v. Sachs,
supra note 8; Cromer v. State, supra note 8.
10 Op. cit. supra note 2 at 32-33.
11 People v. Charles, 15 Misc.2d 401, 180 N.Y.S.2d 635 (County Ct. 1958); People v.
Wylie, 13 Misc2d 3I10, 179 N.Y.S.2d 901 (County Ct. 1958).
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foundation for admitting the graph from the device showing the de-
fendant's excessive speed. The best evidence rule did not require that
the graph made by the tuning forks and by the test car be introduced
since the graph was mere confirmation of what the witness had ob-
served. 12 The same jurisdiction held that the evidence of the accuracy
test was insufficient where a test was made with 40 and 60 mph tuning
forks but without the 80 mph tuning fork and without a run-through
test with a car with a calibrated speedometer. 13 A Missouri court re-
versed a conviction where the police officer testified that the only test
made of the radar speedmeter was with a tuning fork, and the accuracy
of the fork used was not shown. The tuning fork test was not made at
the site of the defendant's alleged offense at some unknown time.
Neither was a "run-through" test with another vehicle going at a known
speed made.
1 4
The third way to check the accuracy of radar equipment is to run a
vehicle with a calibrated speedometer through the trap and compare the
speedometer reading against the reading on the radar meter. A convic-
tion was sustained on the basis of a test by driving a highway patrol
vehicle through the radar zone at varying speeds almost immediately
before the arrest of the defendant.15 But a New York court held that a
test of the radar equipment for accuracy by a vehicle's speedometer
which itself had not been tested or, if tested, no proof thereof being
introduced, did not constitute evidence of the accuracy of the radar
equipment. It was admissible evidence but insufficient to sustain a con-
viction without additional evidence. Testing by the tuning fork method
would, if offered, constitute additional evidence. 16 The testimony of
qualified observers would also constitute additional proof if the record
showed the witness's expertise in judging speed, which means evidence
based on specific experience and familiarity with motor vehicles and
their speed and not the casual observation of general experience.' 7 A
conviction for speeding was reversed where a police officer testified as to
speed readings of a radar unit used in determining the speed of the
defendant's vehicle and further testified that in order to test the radar
unit he had driven a vehicle through the trap at 60 mph but gave no
evidence as to the accuracy of the unit during the test. The court held
that the accuracy of the radar unit on location was an essential element,
and this had not been proven.' s A statement of the rule in the same jur-
12 State v. Lenzen, 24 Conn. Supp. 208, 189 A.2d 405 (Cir. Ct. App. Div. 1962).
13 State v. Carta, 2 Conn. Cir. 68, 194 A.2d 544 (1962).
14 City of St. Louis v. Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. App. 1963).
15 State v. Graham, supra note 8.
16 People v. Johnson, 23 Misc.2d 11, 196 N.Y.S.2d 227 (County Ct. 1960).
17 People v. Fletcher, 216 N.Y.S.2d 34 (County Ct. 1961).
18 Wilson v. State, 328 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959).
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isdiction was that the evidence to support a conviction was below the
standard required when a police officer testified that he checked the
radar unit after the arrest and at the end of test period, but the results
of the tests were inadvertently not shown. 19 However, here opinion
testimony as to speed by the officers added sufficient testimony to result
in a sustained conviction. A Virginia court held that testimony by an
officer in the radar car that the test was made by having a fellow officer
drive a patrol car through the trap at specified speeds was hearsay as to
those speeds at which the fellow officer drove, and amounted to a mere
surmise that the test for accuracy had been carried out. 20
Dr. John M. Kopper, a recognized authority in the field of elec-
tronics, has testified in several of the reported radar cases and has writ-
ten many articles on the subject of "Doppler Effect" radar. In an article
entitled "The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedmeters," 21 he made
some suggestions as to the correct procedures to use when operating
radar. Dr. Kopper stressed the importance of checking the meter for
accuracy each time it is set up for use. It should be checked at each site
used, even if at more than one site on the same morning, to avoid the
contention that the meter was thrown out of adjustment during transit.
The meter should be checked before the beginning of the period of ob-
servation of a highway and at the end of the period. If there is a differ-
ence of more than two miles per hour between the meter and the test
car's speedometer, steps should be taken to remedy the matter. Such a
test naturally requires periodic checking of the speedometer of the test
car.
22
Radar and Signs
Several other jurisdictions besides Ohio require signs to be posted
when radar is in use. The object of the requirement of such posting is
to eliminate the possible contention that the use of radar in the given
situation is an entrapment.23 Ohio's radar statute2 4 requires the posting
of an official "Speed Meter Ahead" sign not less than 750 feet nor more
than 1500 feet ahead of any mechanical, electrical, or radar speed-timing
device. What does this mean?
In 1953, when Ohio's radar statute was passed, the type of radar in
use resulted in the radar transmitter and the point of measurement
being coincidental. There was no problem, since the statute referred to
19 Holley v. State, 366 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
20 Crosby v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 266, 130 S.E.2d 467 (1963).
21 33 N.C.L. Rev. 343 (1954-55).
22 Id. at 353, see also People v. Offerman, supra note 6.
23 Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 876, 96 S.E.2d 813 (1957); Opinion 3112, Ops.
Att'y Gen. 524 (Ohio 1962).
24 Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 4511.091.
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the distance from the sign to the unit and the unit was the point of con-
tact with the radar beam. But subsequent improvements have brought
about a unit that can shoot its beam up the road several hundred feet.
Does the statute then refer to the distance from the sign to the trans-
mitter or to the point of contact with the beam? Richmond Heights'
mayor's court convicted a motor vehicle operator for a speeding viola-
tion based on radar. At the trial the arresting officer testified that the
one-man radar device was situated 1356 feet from the warning sign and
that Cardwell was 346 feet past the sign when he was timed by the radar
beam. Cardwell appealed the conviction to the Court of Common Pleas
of Cuyahoga County on the ground that there was a 750-foot "zone of
immunity" after the sign before a measurement of speed could be taken.
Judge Saul S. Daneceau held that the legislative intent of 4511.091
O.R.C. was to establish such a "zone of immunity." The City of Rich-
mond Heights appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the Common Pleas
decision was upheld unanimously.2 5 Based on this interpretation of the
statute, police in Ohio should be required to prove exactly at what
point along the road the vehicle of the defendant was timed.
Mark McElroy, as Attorney General, rendered an opinion on radar
signs in which he stressed the legislative purpose in enacting the Ohio
.statute. He said it was clear that the legislative purpose was to prevent
the use of radar and similar devices in such a fashion as would "trap"
motorists. This purpose was accomplished by requiring the posting of
signs, thereby requiring that "fair warning" must be given that the law
is being enforced. The legislature, he reiterated, clearly intended to give
the motorist reasonable notice of the use of such devices. 
2
All the criteria for the reasonable posting of radar signs are not
contained in the radar statute alone. Section 4511.09 O.R.C. calls for the
adoption of a Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices 27 to apply to
all traffic control devices erected in Ohio after its adoption. The original
manual was adopted in 1956 and revised in 1962. Neither the original
nor its revision mentioned the "Speed Meter Ahead" sign. But with the
1963 edition, it was placed in the section under "Regulatory Signs" with
certain standards for its erection and use. Sections 4511.10 and 4511.11
require that all traffic control devices conform to the manual. It is gen-
erally held that no provision of the traffic laws for which signs are
required may be enforced against an alleged violator if an official sign
25 City of Richmond Heights v. Cardwell, Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, No.
26964-unreported case.
26 Opinion 3112, Ops. Att'y Gen. 524 (Ohio 1962) at 528.
27 Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, pre-
pared by the Ohio Department of Highways, Division of Operations, Bureau of
Traffic (1963). The manual conforms to the standard of the national manual on
uniform traffic control devices as published by the U. S. Bureau of Public Roads in
1961.
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is not in proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordi-
narily observant person.28
It might be of interest to lawyers and to defendants in radar viola-
tion situations to look to the manner in which the "Speed Meter Ahead"
sign was posted and to compare its posting with the standards in the
Ohio Manual. The standards of the Manual relate to legibility, height,
lateral position, letter size, et cetera, under various conditions. The sign
required for Expressways and Interstate highways measures 48 inches
by 60 inches and has 8-inch letters. For other road types smaller signs
with either 4- or 6-inch letters are required.
As late as the summer of 1966 the Ohio State Patrol was using the
substandard sign on the Ohio Turnpike. The Manual also provides that
the "sign shall be erected temporarily whenever . .. any law enforce-
ment officer uses a radar device for the determination of the speed of
a motor vehicle .. ,, 29 Prior to 1963 many law enforcement agencies
erected permanent signs in places where they regularly operated their
radar units. The intent of the Manual is that the signs be posted only
when the radar is actually in use. As a result most of the municipalities
have removed their permanent signs and erect temporary signs each
time they use radar.
Courts in other jurisdictions have since the early days of the auto-
mobile recognized the importance of strict compliance with the law in
regard to sign erection. The Iowa Supreme Court 30 reversed a speeding
conviction for failure of the town of Decatur to display an arrow point-
ing in the direction towards which the speed was to be reduced. The
Court stated at page 451:
It may be that the defendant was in no wise misled by the fail-
ure of the officers of plaintiff to cause an arrow to be placed upon
the sign in question, but the law must be given general application.
The placing of an arrow upon signs displayed at highways entering
cities and towns, and at points therein, where a change is required
in the speed of motor vehicles, is as much a part of the legislative
requirement as that same shall have certain words of sufficient size
to be easily readable inscribed thereon .... Local authorities have
no discretion in the matter, and cannot say with what part of the
statute they will comply or what ignore.
28 6 Ohio Jur. 2d 333. See also State v. Grillot, 2 OhioApp.2d 81, 206 N.E.2d 420
(1964), where the Court of Appeals of Miami County reversed a conviction of the
defendant for making a cross-over at a point where signs were erected forbidding
such action where it was shown that the defendant was in a position of violation
before he could effectively read the command of the sign.
29 Op. cit. supra note 27, at 33.
30 Town of Decatur v. Gould, 185 Iowa 203, 170 N.W. 449 (1919), approved and
affirmed in Town of Randolph v. Gee, 199 Iowa 181, 201 N.W. 567 (1925); State v.
Noyes, 180 A. 893 (Vt. 1935).
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Four years later the same court upheld the decision and stated that
the burden of showing that a city had complied with the law as to sign
posting in a criminal case is on the state, and it is not to be presumed
that public officials have done their duty as prescribed by statute.3 1
In a recent Pennsylvania case3 2 the court held the state's failure to
prove the existence of signs on the road indicating that radar was in use
as required by law precluded a conviction based on radar evidence. It
was reversible error for the lower court to take judicial notice of the
existence of official warning signs erected on the highway in question.
Failure to comply with the Uniform Traffic Control Devices Manual
when using radar at night led to the acquittal of an alleged speeding
violation in State v. Wibeit.3 3 The court found from the evidence that
the highway markers and control signs were not illuminated: The
"Speed Meter Ahead" sign was not illuminated or reflectorized; and
there was not enough proof to sustain evidence that the forty-five (45)
mile per hour speed control sign was reflectorized. It was held that a
speeding offense alleged to have occurred at night was not established
in view of Section 4511.091, R.C., which requires that the sign be legible
to the operators of approaching vehicles. Further, the requirements of
the Uniform Traffic Control Devices Manual are that signs which are
to convey their messages during hours of darkness shall be reflectorized
or illuminated.
Other Defenses Raised to Radar
In Pennsylvania a radar speeding conviction was reversed for want
of competent evidence of the fact that the radar apparatus was of a type
approved by the Secretary of Revenue as required by statute.34
A defense sometimes presented is that the use of the radar speed-
meter to catch speeding violators constitutes a "speed trap" and, thus, is
an entrapment. No case can be found to support this contention. A case
coming from the State of Washington held that the use of radar did not
constitute a "speed trap" since in using the radar no factor of lapsed
time of a vehicle while traveling through a measured section of highway
was involved.3 5 Another case held that the only type of "speed trap"
prohibited by California statute is one combining four characteristics:
(1) a particular section of highway; (2) measured as to distance; (3)
with boundaries marked, designated or otherwise determined; and (4)
31 State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1134, 196 N.W. 82 (1923).
32 Commonwealth v. Brose, 412 Pa. 276, 194 A.2d 322 (1963).
33 9 Ohio Misc. 158 (Mun. Ct. 1967).
34 Commonwealth v. Perdock, 411 Pa. 301, 192 A.2d 221 (1963).
35 State v. Ryan, 48 Wash.2d 304, 293 P.2d 399 (1956).
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the speed of the vehicle calculated by computing the time it takes the
vehicle to travel a known distance.3 6
The issue of the constitutionality of radar speedmeter evidence was
raised in Dooley v. Commonwealth.37 Here it was held that a statute
which provides that the speed of motor vehicles may be checked by the
use of radio micro-waves or other electrical devices, and that the result
of such checks shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the speed of
such motor vehicles in any court or legal proceeding where such speed
is at issue, does not contravene the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court reasoned that
the usual test of constitutionality of statutes which make proof of a cer-
tain fact prima facie or presumptive evidence of another fact is whether
there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the facts
proven and the facts presumed, and where such evidentiary relation
exists and the presumption is found to be both reasonable and rebut-
table, such statutes are not in contradiction of the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A defense often raised is that the wrong car was apprehended. A
Pennsylvania case 3 s held that a police officer's testimony that he knew
the exact spot where the beam first picked up objects and that he ob-
served the defendant's vehicle approach that spot and enter the zone at
which time the radar showed a speeding violation was held to be suf-
ficient to overcome the contention of the defendant that since his car
was one of five in a line spaced 200 to 300 feet apart the officer could
not be certain which vehicle caused the radar unit to register the viola-
tion. But other cases have held that the fast pace at which the recording
often takes place coupled with the short length of time a vehicle is being
read within the "zone of influence" is "might be" testimony or a guess,
and should receive no consideration by the trier of fact.39 Tests have
shown that on a 30-foot wide roadway during a flow of about 500 ve-
hicles per hour, 80 to 90 per cent of the vehicles could be separately
measured. But positive identification of all individual speeds becomes
impossible at flows in excess of 1,000 vehicles per hour on multi-lane
roads.40
Another situation when the wrong car might be clocked arises be-
cause the beam sent out may cover both portions of the highway. Since
the unit measures in both directions, a vehicle going in the opposite
direction might affect the results on the recording graph of the meter by
registering the faster speed against the apprehended slower car.4 1
36 In re Beamer, 133 Cal.App.2d 63, 283 P.2d 356 (1955).
37 198 Va. 32, 92 S.E.2d 348 (1956).
38 Commonwealth v. Bartley, 411 Pa. 286, 191 A.2d 673 (1963).
39 11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts (Supp. 1966, at 34).
40 Id. at 25.
41 Id. at 35.
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There are internal factors that can affect the accuracy of radar
equipment. Errors can arise in the transmitting frequency and in the
frequency meter, i.e., the indicator circuit. An error can be created by
the vehicle and transmitter not being in line. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission requires that the frequency and power input to the
final stage of the meter be checked at least every six months.4 2 There
appears to be no reported case on the question of whether readings
obtained from a radar unit that was not checked as required by law
would be admissible in evidence. There is an opinion by the Ohio Attor-
ney General on the question of whether the readings obtained from
radar units used in an area other than where licensed, which is in viola-
tion of regulations issued by the Federal Communications Commission,
may be properly admitted in evidence. The opinion holds they may be
admitted since the Federal Communications Act is to protect the public
from interference with the national communications system and not to
protect alleged violators of traffic laws.
43
Ohio Cases Concerning Radar
In City of East Cleveland v. Ferel44 the court followed State v. Dan-
tonio45 by holding that evidence of speedmeter readings should be re-
ceived in evidence upon a showing that the apparatus was properly set
up and tested by the police officers using it, without any need for the
independent testimony of electrical engineers as to the meter's general
nature and trustworthiness. An appeal from the decision was taken to
the Supreme Court and the opinion of the Court of Appeals was af-
firmed. 46 There is dictum in the opinion by the Supreme Court to the
effect that procedure under Section 2935.03 of the Revised Code which
authorizes a police officer to make an arrest without a warrant of a per-
son found violating a law of the state, is perhaps distinguished from the
usual method of apprehending violators by use of radar operation. By
this method the officer in the police car ahead, who apprehends the
driver, relies only on information radioed to him by the officer in the
radar car. This problem was cured by amendment of Section 4511.091
in 1963. The statute now specifically allows the officer in the car ahead
to arrest on the basis of a radio message provided such radio message
was dispatched immediately after the speed of the motor vehicle was
recorded and the arresting officer was furnished a description of the
motor vehicle for proper identification and was furnished the recorded
speed.
42 Id. at 26.
43 Opinion 349, Ops. Att'y Gen. 393 (Ohio 1963) at 396.
44 107 OhioApp. 256, 145 N.E.2d 134 (1957).
45 Supra note 7.
46 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958).
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Another case came from the Court of Appeals of Franklin County.4 z
This case was decided on grounds other than questions involving radar.
The court did comment adversely on the testimony of a highway patrol-
man in the lower court. The officer made vague and conflicting state-
ments in establishing the location of the required sign which the defend-
ant claimed he could not locate. It was noted by the Court of Appeals
that this same officer had been reluctant to discuss any of the steps
involved in the operation of the radar unit or what parts were subject
to failure. The officer testified, "Well, it's quite a complex thing. I am
not a technician." The defendant and three witnesses in the car with
him all testified in the lower court that the defendant's speed was be-
tween 50 and 60 miles per hour. The lower court apparently completely
rejected the testimony by the defendant and his three witnesses on the
theory that the use of radar is so highly accurate that other evidence
questioning it lacks probative value. The Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court on the weight of the evidence since there was only a
single witness, i.e., the highway patrolman, to testify as to any alleged
law violation; this evidence was confined to the alleged speed and was
presented in a far from satisfactory manner.
A recent Ohio4s case presented the question: "Does Section 4549.13,
Revised Code, requiring a motor vehicle used by a police officer while
on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing the motor ve-
hicle or traffic laws of the state to be marked in some distinctive manner
or color apply to vehicles used by police officers engaged in enforcing
municipal ordinances?" One of the vehicles used in the radar detection
of the defendant's car was not so marked. Reversing the Court of Ap-
peals, the Supreme Court held that municipal police cars, used in the
enforcement of municipal ordinances regulating speed, were required to
be marked in a distinctive manner. The court reasoned that the intent
of the legislature in enacting the provisions in question was to provide
uniformity in traffic control and regulation in an effort to make driving
safer in all political subdivisions within the state. The legislature also
intended to put a curb upon the speed traps which were often operated
by "peace officers" of the municipalities and townships.
Conclusion
If used correctly, "Doppler effect" radar can be an accurate way to
record the speed of vehicles. But courts should not close their eyes to
the fact that there are things that can affect the radar's accuracy. Police
in using radar should be held to correct procedures both as to ascertain-
ing accuracy each time the unit is used and in complying with the law
47 State v. Wall, 115 OhioApp. 323, 20 OhioOp.2d 408 (1962).
48 City of Dayton v. Adams, 9 Ohio St. 2d 89 (1967), reversing Court of Appeals of
Montgomery County at 3 OhioApp.2d 126, 209 N.E.2d 640 (1965).
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regarding its use. A violation of the traffic law is a criminal offense and
an alleged offender should have the right to first ask if the police who
arrest him have themselves obeyed the law.
There are too few cases, especially in Ohio, on the law applied to
speedmeter evidence. There must be hundreds of cases in Ohio alone
every day concerning radar. The reason that these are not reported
cases is evident: it is simpler and cheaper to pay the fifteen dollars or
so and forget it. But this very fact breeds negligence if not open dis-
regard for the law by the police. At least half or more of the reported
cases are defendant's verdicts.
There needs to be a concentrated attack in Ohio on the flagrant
lack, in so many cases, of reasonable notice of the use of radar as re-
quired in law. A clean, legible sign that conforms to the manual as to
size, position, and erection serves to remind motorists to check their
speed and to remind them that the law is being enforced.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss3/9
